Why is the IDF Occupying (so many of) its Neighbors? (Hard Questions, Tough Answers- January 13, 2025)
Yossi Alpher is an independent security analyst. He is the former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, a former senior official with the Mossad, and a former IDF intelligence officer. Views and positions expressed here are those of the writer, and do not necessarily represent NJN's views and policy positions.
Q. The fate of the Gaza occupation is obviously the most pressing issue. But perhaps you can start by discussing the most recent Arab land occupied: the Israel-Syria border no-man’s land and the Mt. Hermon peak.
A. Occupation in Syria is not only the most recent but also the most complicated issue internationally. Turkey (in the northwest) and the US (in the east) also occupy Syrian lands--far more than does Israel. Nowhere are there clear guidelines or conditions for ending any of these occupations.
Israel, for its part, insists that the relatively small parcel of border area no-man’s-land that it occupied after the fall of Bashar Assad in December of 2024 will be abandoned when Jerusalem is convinced that the new regime in Damascus can ensure stability and that it harbors no threatening Islamic extremist intentions. Meanwhile IDF units in the new Syria buffer zone are providing medical aid to Syrians--but also clashing with anti-Israel demonstrators.
Israel’s suspicions are understandable, for three reasons.
First, Syria has not yet been stabilized. Regime forces are fighting Alawite supporters of Assad in Homs and along the Mediterranean coast. Alawite sources cite growing unrest among this religious minority that previously anchored the Assad regime. There is also unrest among Druze in and around Suwayda near the Syria-Jordan border. Not to mention unresolved Kurdish-Arab-Turkish issues in a huge swath of territory in Syria’s northeast.
Second, Syria’s new rulers previously fought in the ranks of al-Qaeda and ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Today they claim to be more moderate and pluralistic. They say they do not seek conflict with Israel. Having fought militant extremists for the past 16 months, Israel is not yet convinced it can abandon its new buffer zone.
Third, the Turkish factor. Turkish leader Recip Tayyip Erdogan, who supported and sheltered the new Syrian leaders for years in their northwest Syria redoubt, is widely seen as the patron of the new Syrian regime. His aggressive anti-Israel rhetoric gives Jerusalem cause for concern.
The previous Syrian regime, under Assad, hosted Iranian forces that used Syria as a transit point for moving weaponry to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Now Israel harbors similar fears regarding Erdogan with his neo-Ottoman geostrategic ambitions.
One way or another, the presence in Syria of both Turkish and American armed forces is seen by Israel as a mitigating factor in its occupation considerations. And speaking of occupation, there are reports that the Shiite-majority government in neighboring Iraq has asked Washington not to withdraw its 2,000-strong armed contingent from eastern Syria, alleging that it buffers Iraq against any possible aggressive intentions on those now ruling Damascus.
Q. Apropos Hezbollah, IDF occupation of southern Lebanon is scheduled to end later this month. Will that happen?
A. Lately, Israel has alleged that the Lebanese army is not fulfilling its ceasefire obligation to move south and police the Lebanon-Hezbollah-Israel agreement reached last November with US mediation. Israel has attacked suspicious Hezbollah armed activity and has hinted that its forces might remain in Lebanon an extra 30 days. But the election last week--after two years of delays and political intrigue--of a new Lebanese president, army chief Joseph Aoun, appears to bode well for Israeli withdrawal. US mediator Amos Hochstein was in Beirut last week and reportedly vouched for the January 26 deadline.
Q. That brings us to Gaza. This week marks yet another negotiating round in Doha, Qatar, aimed at clinching a deal on Israeli withdrawal and hostage release. Are we about to witness the end of Israel’s military presence withn the Strip?
A. Full IDF withdrawal from the entire Gaza Strip is Hamas’s ultimate condition for releasing all 98 hostages, dead and alive, that Israel claims Hamas is holding deep underground in the Strip. The innovative factor in the current round of talks is the Trump ‘hellfire’ threat (against whom? to do what?) if a deal is not reached by January 20.
The threat is not likely to impress Hamas. But it may have some effect on Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, an ardent Trump supporter who obviously wants to get off on the right foot at the start of Trump’s second presidency.
A Netanyahu pledge of full withdrawal from Gaza will be supported by the IDF and most Israelis. Yet it will pit Netanyahu against his own coalition’s messianists who threaten to bring down the government unless it enables them to exploit the occupation infrastructure that the army is building and paving in Gaza to begin settling at least the northern Strip. His coalition’s collapse would leave Netanyahu at the mercy of both the voters and the courts.
In other words, Netanyahu needs the occupation of Gaza and ongoing (and endless!) war with the remnants of Hamas for his own political survival. Perhaps that is why Defense Minister Katz just pathetically and bombastically directed the IDF, which is currently trying to clear out terrorists from some parts of Gaza for the fourth time (!) in a year, to bring him a plan for “decisive victory”.
This is where the open questions arise. Trump already has his own mediator, Steve Witkoff, shuttling between Doha and Jerusalem. Is Witkoff empowered by Trump to make Netanyahu ‘an offer he can’t refuse’ in return for an Israeli commitment to a full withdrawal in stages? Can a Netanyahu pledge to withdraw be designed with sufficient loopholes to enable him to convince his coalition hawks that Israel will be free down the line to renew the war in Gaza?
Or is Trump (surprise surprise!) bluffing, and unlikely to take any significant action if his January 20 ‘hellfire’ deadline is not met? In any event, Witkoff’s presence in Doha sends Hamas the message that, at least on the hostage/ceasefire issue, Trump and Biden are working in tandem during the presidential transition.
Q. You haven’t mentioned the West Bank . . .
A. Of all four occupations--Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, West Bank--the latter is not in ‘danger’ of ending any time soon. On the contrary, under the current Israeli government settlements are spreading in the West Bank, Palestinians are being displaced, and nothing is likely to change.
Q. Bottom line #1?
Trump’s ‘hellfire’ threats and his demand to end the Gaza war before he takes office on January 20 are understood to be a factor, at least psychologically, in motivating both Hamas and Israel to do a deal. Yet this is the same Trump who talks very aggressively about American territorial expansion: annexing Canada, retaking the Panama Canal, and occupying Greenland.
Accordingly, look for Israel’s land-greedy right-messianists who dominate Netanyahu’s coalition to cite Trump’s inspiration in spinning their schemes to annex both Gazan and West Bank territory. As one sympathetic IDF reservist in the Strip recently stated to a friendly TV camera, “We won’t stop until we complete the task assigned to us: conquer, evict, settle. Hear that, Bibi? Conquer, evict, settle.”
Q. Bottom line #2?
Iran has been beaten by Israel in Lebanon and has been forced out of Syria. Another Iranian proxy, the Houthis in Yemen, are absorbing heavy blows from the US and UK as well as from Israel. Tehran is also gearing up for Trump administration sanctions and pressures on the nuclear issue.
All of which suggests, perversely, that something has to ‘give’ in Tehran. It points to the danger of deniable Iranian-sponsored provocations--along a border, missiles, a terrorist attack?--any day now.
Q. Bottom line #3?
A. Note the undeclared partnership between Netanyahu and Hamas in Gaza. Prior to October 7 Netanyahu made sure that suitcases of dollars from Qatar were delivered to Hamas. He avoided assassinating Hamas leaders and heralded ‘economic peace’ with them. That is what triggered the events of October 7, 2023.
Now Netanyahu makes sure no alternative Palestinian leadership is introduced into the Strip. And he pursues a war without end with Hamas. This seemingly guarantees yet more occupation, either now or at a later stage.