Iran: War or deal?
Yossi Alpher — February 23, 2026
Views and positions expressed here are those of the writer, and do not necessarily represent NJN's views and policy positions.
Q. A US attack on Iran appears imminent. How could this play out?
A. First of all, let’s bear in mind that whatever I write on Sunday and Monday this week could become outdated by the time you read this. But the intensity of media focus and interest in the US-Iran dynamic is such that it seems almost trite to write about some other pressing strategic Middle East issue, particularly in a week featuring President Trump’s annual State of the Union address and renewed anti-regime demonstrations in Iran.
Q. Other pressing Middle East issues, such as?
A. Gaza: The Board of Peace met last week and set into motion a dynamic that, for better or worse, could profoundly affect peace and security in the region. Or the West Bank, where the Israeli messianic right is pushing a disastrous “under the radar” agenda of expulsion and annexation that would turn Israel into an anti-democratic binational entity.
Maybe next week…
Q. Back to Iran, before events pass us by…
A. Here are possible scenarios for the coming days. First and most obviously, President Trump could declare that he is fed up waiting for Iran to come around to a reasonable nuclear deal. Accordingly, he could launch a massive US air and naval bombardment of strategic Iranian targets, with the objective of compelling Iran to accept his conditions of zero nuclear enrichment, etc.
Given the depth and strength of the US buildup, this could conceivably be a prolonged offensive, lasting weeks at a minimum.
Iran could respond with missile attacks on US military targets in the region. It could possibly respond by firing missiles at Israel too and directing its proxies–Hezbollah and the Houthis–to join this attack. This may or may not depend on whether Israel joins the US attack, though if Iran attacks Israel, the latter will surely respond with air attacks on Iran.
Alternatively, Trump could hold off attacking Iran, yielding to MAGA pressures at home, the advice of negotiators Witkoff and Kushner, or to his own fear of escalation getting out of control. He could also conceivably attack limited and symbolic targets (e.g., naval ships) and declare that he is still waiting and hoping for a deal with Iran.
Such an approach could prolong Iran-centered tension for weeks or more. Meanwhile, more negotiations with Iran are scheduled for the week’s end, and a new Iranian proposal is anticipated.
Indeed, we might soon be informed that there is a deal and that the military alert is cancelled. Both sides can back down. Bear in mind that in Trump’s strategic approach–to the extent he thinks strategically–the US naval and air buildup in the Middle East is an integral part of US negotiating strategy. In effect, Trump seems to be ‘making Iran an offer it can’t refuse’ by displaying overwhelming strength–all in the best mafia/Godfather tradition.
As for Iran, its leaders have no problem doing a deal by making what for them are tactical concessions and reversals as long as long-term goals are not sacrificed and the regime itself is safe. Khamenei can always cite the example of his predecessor, Khomeini, ‘drinking the chalice of poison’ and accepting a ceasefire with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 1988.
Q. Last June, Israel attacked Iran on its own. The US joined only at the last minute. Is this a viable repeat scenario?
A. Note that both Israeli and American boasts regarding the damage they did to Iran’s strategic infrastructure in June ring somewhat hollow today. Iran has apparently learned and applied lessons from its losses; it clearly continues to deploy a sufficient missile strike force to cause Israel serious concern. And Trump is sufficiently worried about Iran’s residual military nuclear capabilities to explain his ongoing threats.
Here is an extreme scenario. Prime Minister Netanyahu is convinced that Trump is hesitating to attack Iran. Netanyahu is in need of a new strategic achievement as Israeli elections approach. Accordingly, he opts for a repeat of the Twelve-Day War of last June, hoping that he will thereby force Trump’s hand.
Q. What about additional conditions for a US-Iran agreement, such as dismantling Iran’s missile arsenal?
A. My impression is that Trump’s negotiators are focusing on the nuclear issue because this is what Iran is offering, and this can be described as affecting global security, including US security, thereby giving Trump yet another opportunity to declare he has, in effect, ‘ended a war.’
Limiting Iran’s missiles and ceasing to support proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis are very understandable demands made by Israel–and possibly by the Gulf Arab states. But a US-Iran agreement is liable, at best, to pay lip service to these conditions. Trump can ‘declare victory’ without fulfilling them and chalk up another ‘peacemaking’ success alongside temporary and doubtful achievements like reconciling between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Remember, this is the same US president who is sending a hospital ship to… Greenland.
In this connection, it is interesting to note reports in recent days that a US-Iran deal could include an Iranian commitment to cease inciting for the destruction of Israel. Iran and its Islamist proxies are virtually the only Middle East actors that still call for Israel to cease to exist. While obviously this would be merely a declarative concession, if it happens it should be welcomed by Israel and its supporters.
It should also be welcomed by the United Nations, which for 47 years has inexplicably tolerated a situation in which one of its member states calls for the annihilation of another. Then too, whatever Trump gets from Iran has to satisfy his ego and to ‘one-up’ President Obama’s JCPOA Iran-nuclear achievement of 2015 that Trump cancelled disdainfully. An Iranian commitment to cease inciting against Israel would look good in this connection.
Q. US sources have talked about a war objective of assassinating Khamenei. Both the US and Israel have assassinated militant Islamist leaders, from Iran’s Qassem Soleimani to Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah. Is this a strategy? Does it work?
A. Decapitation is an option bandied about by the media and some Iran pundits: taking out Ayatollah Khamenei and the Iranian leadership, on the assumption that either the resultant chaos or a new and more rational leadership will enable the nuclear concessions that Trump is demanding.
This is not a credible approach. The ranks of Iran’s Islamist leadership, and particularly the Revolutionary Guards, are deep enough and deeply indoctrinated enough to ensure an orderly succession. Note in particular the leadership role increasingly played by Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and an intimate of Khamenei.
In effect, the Iranian Islamists who deposed the Shah 47 years ago and installed the Islamic Republic have gone to considerable lengths in terms of institutionalization of the revolution and brutal oppression of opposition elements to ensure their survival even under prolonged attack. Besides, Khamenei is obviously well protected.
Note that last June, Israel successfully targeted Iranian military leaders without any apparent long-term effect on Iranian military readiness.
Leaving aside moral and ethical considerations and looking strictly at the issue of assassinating terrorists and extremists, there are instances where, in the Israel vs. Islamists arena, assassinations can be judged to have a strategic effect. Soleimani’s and Nasrallah’s removal from the scene did undoubtedly set back their respective militant Islamist agendas. In contrast, Israel’s repeated targeting of Hamas leaders in Gaza over the past three years appears to have had little-to-no short-term impact, although over the long term it may indeed have contributed to an overall weakening of Hamas.
It is hard to escape the impression that targeted assassinations at the Islamist military level have mainly been intended for ‘boasting rights’ by Israel’s leadership, in lieu of any substantive gains. Remember how the IDF spokesman would announce that, “We have removed 10 Hamas battalion leaders in the past three months.” So what? They all were quickly replaced. And the IDF has still not defeated Hamas.
Q. Suppose a massive US attack is launched and it has a far-reaching effect on Iran’s geostrategic stability…
A. Beware what you wish for. Fragmentation of Iran is a major concern of Washington’s Gulf Arab friends–Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar and Bahrain. In a worst-case scenario, we could witness unrest among the minority ethnic groups along Iran’s borders and Sunni-Shi’ite unrest in countries like Bahrain. Neighbors like Turkey could be sucked in. Lines in the Middle East could be redrawn in ways no one can anticipate.
Q. Bottom line?
A. I’ll go out on a limb: 51 percent probability of a US-Iran deal rather than war.
Yossi Alpher is an independent security analyst. He is the former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, a former senior official with the Mossad, and a former IDF intelligence officer.
