NJN Brief: IHRA Definition of Antisemitism – What It Means, And Why It’s a Problem
May 27, 2026
The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) Working Definition of Antisemitism plays a major role in today’s debates about antisemitism, Israel, and free expression. It was created as a tool for researchers – yet it’s most frequently deployed to police political speech. This fact sheet walks through what IHRA says, how its examples undermine free speech and struggles against antisemitism, and why New Jewish Narrative and many others advocate against its use outside of academic research.
What Is the IHRA Definition?
Adopted in 2016, IHRA defines antisemitism as follows:
“Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”
The IHRA definition is always presented along with these examples of what might constitute antisemitism:
To guide IHRA in its (research) work, the following examples may serve as illustrations:
Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic. Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for “why things go wrong.” It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.
Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to:
Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.
Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective — such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.
Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.
Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).
Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.
Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.
Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.
Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.
Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.
Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.
Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.
What’s wrong with this definition?
IHRA’s definition is both inadequate and counterproductive in the effort to fight antisemitism.
While the two core sentences constituting the IHRA definition lack clarity and demarcation, the main problem follows from the examples attached to the IHRA definition, which are framed and treated as an integral part of it.
Seven of these examples relate to Israel. Some of them go beyond what can simply be regarded as antisemitism, crossing the line into policing political views.
Can you elaborate?
Absolutely. One of the “examples” regards “applying double standards” to Israel, or requiring of Israel “behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation” as antisemitic. It uses a broad brush to paint legitimate criticism of Israel and Israeli government policies as antisemitic: Who gets to decide what is a double standard and what is not, and what behavior is expected or demanded of other democratic nations?
The absurdity of this example is evident when you consider Israeli citizens. Wouldn’t it be natural for them to hold their own country to a higher standard? After all, haven’t we all been told that Israel is “the only democracy in the Middle East?” Does that mean that their political speech is a manifestation of antisemitism?
Another example asserts that “denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor” is antisemitic. This similarly sweeps in a wide swath of legitimate political views. For instance, if someone believes that every nation-state is inherently racist, that person’s view that Israel is also a racist state could not reasonably be conceived of as antisemitic. This example also includes all anti-Zionists and post-Zionists. While it is true that some anti-Zionists are motivated by antisemitism, to depict any and all non-Zionist views as antisemitic is factually wrong, politically misleading, and ethically misguided.
Wait a minute. The IHRA definition isn’t that categorical. It says that these examples “could” be antisemitic when “taking into account the overall context.”
This is where the gap between a research tool and a legal tool comes into play.
First, we should note that these examples are already being codified into laws throughout the United States in ways that limit free speech and legitimate criticism directed at Israeli government policies by tarnishing individuals and organizations as antisemitic.
Take, for instance, Virginia’s HB1606. Passed in 2023, the law officially adopts IHRA’s antisemitism definition to be used “as a tool” for the purpose of “recognizing and combating antisemitic hate crimes…” This language could be interpreted as allowing for the criminalization of criticism of Israel.
And the effort to codify the IHRA definition is not limited to the state level. There have been numerous attempts to pass legislation through Congress that would enshrine this definition into federal law.
Second, being labeled an antisemite can carry more than legal penalties. It can also result in sanctions taken outside of the legal system (for instance, a person can lose their job or suffer severe reputational damage). Laws that paint antisemitism too broadly can generate fear among ordinary people that their legitimate speech might be misconstrued as antisemitism, bringing these sorts of consequences. This is a classic example of a “chilling effect” that leads to self-censorship. The Supreme Court has long recognized that chilling effects threaten free speech.
But nobody seriously thinks that non-antisemites who violate one of the examples are going to face punishment, right?
Kenneth Stern, the lead drafter of the IHRA definition, has warned for years about the dangers of embracing the IHRA definition and its examples as a legal tool. Initially, some people thought that his warning was hyperbole.
Sadly, since the start of the second Trump administration, the federal government has repeatedly weaponized the IHRA definition of antisemitism and its working examples. Academic institutions have been targeted for speech allowed on their campuses and pro-Palestine protesters have found their immigration status threatened due to their speech.
For all of these reasons, NJN opposes the codification of IHRA into law at the federal, state, or local level.
Is the IHRA definition the only game in town?
No. Since 2021, at least two alternative definitions have been put forward: the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism by hundreds of scholars of antisemitism, Holocaust studies, Jewish studies, and Middle East studies, as well as the Nexus Document, created by a task force affiliated with Bard College and the University of Southern California. While acknowledging that criticism of Israel can be antisemitic, these alternative definitions set out more clearly what constitutes antisemitism and provide guidance surrounding the contours of legitimate speech and action around Israel and Palestine.
Can you sum up why New Jewish Narrative opposes the IHRA working definition of antisemitism?
Because the IHRA definition is weaponized to shut down criticism of Israeli government policies and actions.
Because we are American Jews who are living through the most severe rise in antisemitism since World War II. We know that an overly expansive definition of antisemitism acts as a red herring; it shifts the conversation from the problem of antisemitism to whether the definition being used is accurate or fair. It saps resources that could be spent responding to the problem. The bitter irony is that the effort to instrumentalize the IHRA definition as a legal weapon ends up normalizing antisemitism.
Because we care deeply about Israel’s well-being. We know that there are Israeli government policies that are detrimental to Israel’s future, and that these policies need to be vocally opposed. Efforts to instrumentalize the fight against antisemitism to shield and sustain such policies are harmful to Israel.
Because we are Americans who want to live in a democratic society in concert with our neighbors. Advancing the IHRA definition as anything more than a research tool harms free speech and drives a wedge between Americans.
