Yossi Alpher — October 26, 2026
Views and positions expressed here are those of the writer, and do not necessarily represent NJN's views and policy positions.
Q. Most people will read this on election day, October 27, or in the days after. So aren’t predictions pointless? What remarks can you offer that have ‘shelf life?’
A. Let’s skip predictions for now and talk about insights we can glean from these elections that are relevant to Israel in general as well as to the next election. Note that the next election might be around the corner if this contest does not produce a concrete and workable outcome in the form of a stable coalition.
Let’s start by looking at the most obvious of the broader dynamics: there is no longer a significant left-right divide in Israeli political life. Aside from The Democrats — formerly Labor and Meretz — all the Zionist parties are center-right, right-wing, and right-religious in orientation. Further, the religious element is prominent even in ostensibly ‘secular’ party lists like Yashar (Eizenkot) and the Likud. Not to mention B’yachad head Naftali Bennett, the only Orthodox former prime minister, who has excelled as the most dynamic campaigner of this round of elections.
This seemingly new dichotomy between a large ‘Jewish’ (i.e., religious or traditional) majority and a small secular ‘Israeli’ minority appears to be one side-effect on the national psyche of the October 7, 2023 massacre in the Gaza Periphery and of the ensuing three-year (and counting) war. This is one side-effect that is not likely to fade any time soon.
Another is national paranoia. Prime Minister Netanyahu played on this with last-minute attempts to sell the public fears of massive economic sanctions (“We’ll rely on bitcoin”) and attack by Iran (an AI portrayal of a mushroom cloud over Tel Aviv). Netanyahu’s own private paranoia led him to beg US President Trump not once but twice for a social media endorsement.
Q. So what will the elections be remembered for?
A. There are major new agenda items in these elections that were far less prominent in the past. For one, this election is about a single dominant political figure, Netanyahu, his record and his future – all for the most part embodied in the opposition’s demand since October 7 for a national commission of inquiry about the war. Then too, because of the manpower strain of a prolonged multi-front war, the election is also about the demand for compulsory military service for Israel’s growing Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) community, whose cult-like voters enjoy clout and possibly a veto in potential coalitions.
On the other hand, there is little or no debate about any sort of peace process with our neighbors, Palestinian or other. In contrast, the war is very much an issue, as are the economic and other sanctions that are closing in on Israel in the war’s shadow.
Q. The media present these elections as the most fateful in Israel’s history. Why?
A. I dispute this description. It is very possible the elections will decide nothing of note and Israel’s security and religious-secular stalemates will characterize the next coalition too. The hype and dramatic language used to describe the elections appear to reflect the country’s ongoing national trauma since October 7. That may not change. It is interesting to note that there have been no significant violent incidents inside Israel during this election campaign — as if people remain preoccupied with alternative national worries. (But look for violent disturbances on election day.)
Q. Why is the extent of voter turnout so significant?
A. In recent elections, roughly 70 percent of eligible voters came to the polls. The higher the turnout, the bigger the ‘pie’ of 120 members of Knesset that is divided among the party lists based on their percentage of the total. This is particularly significant in these elections because of the potential of a few small ‘boutique’ lists to break through the four percent threshold needed to qualify for the Knesset. The bigger the pie, the bigger the four percent challenge. Given that according to virtually all the polls, neither Netanyahu’s coalition nor the opposition coalition gets anywhere near 61 MKs, the performance of the small lists, and their politics, are likely to become critical.
Q. You are referring to lists of renegade religious rightists like those of retired brigadier general Ofer Winter and the combined ‘reservists-economy’ list of Yoaz Hendel and Yaron Zelicha.
A. If, for example, one or both of these lists pass the four-mandate threshold, their decision as to which bloc to join could decide the election. If, on the other hand, they fall short of the threshold and their votes are effectively tossed out, the question becomes, at whose expense? Were these potential Netanyahu voters or potential Eizenkot voters? Meanwhile, the loss of their votes reduces the overall size of the Knesset voter ‘pie’ to the benefit of the larger parties.
Assuming the boutique lists do not, fearing oblivion, drop out of the elections at the last minute, this means their votes will seem to have disproportionate influence and the vote count could go down to the wire.
For historical perspective, note that in elections four years ago Meretz fell just short of the threshold, thereby disappearing from the Knesset and, thanks to election math, contributing significantly to the Likud/Netanyahu victory.
Q. Surely you are not going to pass up this opportunity to present your scenarios for a likely election outcome…
A. The likelihood of a stalemate between the pro and anti-Netanyahu camps is so strong that most of the scenarios are, to say the least, depressing. Here are some of the more likely ones, some possibly overlapping, and all listed in no particular order of likelihood:
1. The anti-Netanyahu coalition registers an upset, maybe even a landslide. This defies the polls and reflects some sort of unpolled below-the-horizon anti-Bibi sentiments. Eizenkot can at a minimum rally a plurality of MKs, and conceivably a majority, to form a center-right coalition without the Likud, the Kahanists, and the Haredim. The new coalition’s biggest political challenge will be to hold onto its large anti-Bibi right-religious component in the face of Likud enticements to switch allegiances.
2. The opposite. Netanyahu wins by a close majority. You don’t believe it because it defies the polls? Just ask Bibi’s supporters…
3. The anti-Netanyahu coalition is not close enough to a majority to manage without an Arab party. Mansour Abbas’s Raam, whose number two is a courageous former police general, Yoav Segelovich, is ready and willing. But within the victorious coalition, Avigdor Liberman’s rightist (but anti-Bibi) Yisrael Beitenu balks at collaborating with an Arab party. Crisis.
4. Meanwhile … Netanyahu’s right-Kahanist-Haredi coalition loses, but Netanyahu, taking a leaf from Trump, alleges voter fraud and launches a January 6-style protest aimed at paralyzing political life. Renewed war with Iran offers Netanyahu a rallying cry. He remains interim prime minister at least until the smoke clears.
5. Meanwhile … the Eizenkot-led opposition with its plurality succeeds in convening the newly-elected Knesset, electing a new chairperson and ramming through legislation aimed at preventing Netanyahu from holding office due to the criminal charges pending against him.
6. Meanwhile … President Herzog proposes to break the post-election national political logjam by offering a sweeping pardon to Netanyahu on condition that he resign from politics. Does Netanyahu accept? Does the opposition agree?
Q. Let’s assume Netanyahu’s coalition remains in office, even for a six-month pause while, due to electoral stalemate, new elections are organized. Israel faces violence on all fronts: West Bank, Iran, etc. What can we expect in the interim from the international community? From the Israeli public?
A. Portions of the international community are likely to initiate new and additional sanctions, both diplomatic and economic. Netanyahu just shared his assessment in this regard by suggesting that the Israeli economy can (like North Korea and Russia!!!) rely on crypto: a dark vision indeed.
As for the Israeli public, there is an uncounted sector of angry and disaffected liberals and others who are simply fed up with years (!!) of reserve duty and economic sacrifice. They have put their own radical plans on hold pending these elections. In view of the dead-end election outlook, they will now pick up and leave.
They will conclude that Israel has become hopelessly messianic and rightist. Its demography is against them. They will join the brain drain of doctors and techies who have been leaving in despair since October 7. They will move everywhere in the world, from Cyprus to Australia. They will not be around to vote against Bibi in the inevitable next election.
Yossi Alpher is an independent security analyst. He is the former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, a former senior official with the Mossad, and a former IDF intelligence officer.
